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Preventing Row Hammer Attacks by Dynamic Indirection of Row Addresses
ABSTRACT
Row hammer in dynamic random access memories (DRAM) is an effect by which
repeatedly activating a row of the DRAM causes bits in nearby rows to flip. Because OS and
program variables can be stored adjacent to each other in the DRAM, a malicious program can
repeatedly activate DRAM rows to flip nearby bits that store important OS states (e.g., program
privileges). In this manner, an attacker can gain unauthorized, privileged access to a computer.
This disclosure describes techniques that use a combination of indirection and randomization to
make it difficult for an attacker to hammer DRAM rows. Per the techniques, the relationship
between memory addresses and physical rows is made random and dynamic, such that the
physical relationship between the rows is difficult, if not impossible, to discover and exploit.
KEYWORDS
● Dynamic random access memory (DRAM)
● Row hammer attack
● Logical-to-physical table
● Row buffer
BACKGROUND
A dynamic random access memory (DRAM) includes banks of memory cells organized
into rows and columns. Before a row can be read or modified, it must be activated, which is
when its contents are copied into the row buffer. Only one row of a bank can be activated at a
given point in time. To activate another row, the bank is pre-charged, readying it to activate a
different row.
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Activating a row repeatedly can cause bits in nearby rows to flip. This is known as the
row hammer effect. It is not uncommon for program-related instructions or variables to be stored
adjacent to operating-system instructions or variables. A malicious program can repeatedly
activate DRAM rows that store its own variables, with the effect that nearby rows that store
important OS states (e.g., user or program privileges) flip. An attacker can thus gain
unauthorized, privileged access to a computer. As DRAMs become increasingly dense, physics
dictates that the row-hammer effect will intensify, making computers more vulnerable.
Rows repeatedly accessed (hammered) by an attacker are known as aggressor rows.
Rows that experience bit flips are known as victim rows. Some current techniques of hardening
against row hammer attacks refresh victim rows; however, these do not defend against bit flips
that occur at row distances greater than unity. Other techniques that attempt to harden against
row hammer attacks entail a static DRAM remapping scheme that distributes row hammer errors
over multiple words. An error pattern thus distributed over a large group of words can be
recovered by an error-correcting code. The focus of such techniques, however, is data integrity
rather than a security. To the extent that such techniques at all achieve secure computing, they
amount to security-by-obscurity.
Operating system based techniques to harden against row hammer attacks include the use
of hardware performance counters to detect row hammer events. Once detected, such attacks are
foiled by copying data and moving page table entries to move the page that is being hammered.
Alternatively, once a row hammer is detected, the rows can simply be refreshed.
Some mitigation techniques count, and bound, row activations without tracking per-row
bits. Row hammer attacks are mitigated by the bound on the number of row activations within
one refresh window. The enforcement mechanism is the refreshing of the adjacent (victim) rows.
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These techniques are typically implemented outside the DRAM, e.g., in the register clock driver,
which can be expensive in terms of space.
A probabilistic approach to mitigating row hammer is to refresh neighboring rows with
some probability upon each activation. The expectation is that any row hammering attempt is
likely to result in refreshes to neighboring (potential victim) rows, due to the large number of
activations carried out during a row hammer attack. Again, the mechanism of enforcement is the
refreshing of victim row(s). This approach becomes more complex as the row hammer distances
increase. For example, on highly dense DRAM, it is possible to cause bit flips two rows away
from an aggressor row. In such a scenario the number of refreshes can potentially grow
unsustainably. Being typically implemented in the memory controller, probabilistic approaches
are limited by the double data rate (DDR) protocol, which bounds the number of refreshes that
can actually happen. Additionally, the probabilistic nature means that strong guarantees about
preventing bit flips cannot be provided. Probabilistic approaches can work if the memory
controller has complete knowledge of row-adjacency inside the DRAM chip and the probability
value is set close enough to unity. However, the transmission of row-adjacency information from
DRAM to memory controller leads to power and performance overheads that may be
unsustainable. Setting the probability value too close to unity can trigger a lot of false positives,
whereby false victim rows are frequently and unnecessarily refreshed, leading to unsustainable
energy consumption.
Thus, existing techniques utilized by DRAM and memory controller vendors to prevent
row hammer attacks are limited in the ability to mitigate such attacks.
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DESCRIPTION
To successfully execute a row hammer attack, an attacker needs to deduce information
about neighboring DRAM rows. This information is usually static, and once figured out, enables
the attacker to repeatedly access certain rows to cause bit-flips in a nearby row. This disclosure
describes techniques that use a combination of indirection and randomization to make it difficult
for an attacker to hammer rows. Per the techniques, the relationship between memory addresses
and physical rows is made random and dynamic, such that the physical relationship between the
rows is difficult, if not impossible, to discover and exploit.
In addition to the row buffer, the techniques augment a memory bank with another buffer
known as the swap buffer, which has the same size as the row buffer. Loading the swap buffer
has a cost similar to that of row activation. An indirection table, known as the logical-to-physical
(L2P) table, maps an incoming logical row to a physical row in the bank. For example, if a bank
has 64K rows, then the L2P table can comprise 64K two-byte entries. Entries of the L2P table
can be initialized as a permutation of the physical rows. The k th row of the L2P table is
referred to as L2P[k]. The L2P table can be stored in a static RAM (SRAM) block coupled to
the DRAM module. Further, the mappings specified by the L2P table are confined to the DRAM
module, with no method provided to surface the mappings.
When a row is activated in the idle state, rather than using the raw offset to read a row
from the bank, the row number is looked up in the L2P table and the corresponding physical row
is activated. In particular, when a logical row src is pre-charged, the following take place:
● The logical row number src is looked up in the L2P table to arrive at a physical row number
src′.
● A logical row index, dest, is randomly generated.
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● The logical row number dest is looked up in the L2P table to arrive at physical row number
dest′.
● The contents of the row dest′ are loaded into the swap buffer.
● The current contents of the row buffer are moved into the row dest′.
● The contents of the swap buffer are moved into the row src′.
● L2P[src] and L2P[dest] are swapped.

(a)

(b)

Fig. 1: The L2P map and the physical layout of bits in the DRAM: (a) Before relocation of logical
row 10; (b) After the relocation of logical row 10.

Effectively, physical rows are swapped for two logical rows. This involves swapping the
content between the physical rows and updating the L2P to reflect this change, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. Fig. 1(a) illustrates the L2P map and the physical layout of bits in the DRAM prior to
relocation of logical row 10, which is presently mapped to physical row 1. Fig. 1(b) illustrates
the L2P map and the physical layout of bits in the DRAM after the swapping of logical row 10
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with a randomly selected row, such that logical row 10 now maps to physical row 3. Thus, the
contents of physical rows number 1 and 3 have been interchanged.
A row hammer attack entails repeated activation of one or more aggressor rows. Even if
the attacker were to find the original mapping of the rows necessary to mount a row hammer
attack, with the implementation of row swapping described herein, the mapping changes as soon
as the rows are pre-charged (or after a certain number of activation/precharge cycles have
elapsed, as further described below). Further, as explained before, the mappings of the L2P are
confined to the DRAM module, with no method to extract them. The shifting, randomized
mapping of the L2P table and its confinement to the DRAM module render repeated hammering
of the same set of rows nearly impossible.
Copying of data within a DRAM can be done efficiently using primitives, e.g., as
described in [1]. The use of such primitives for copying is efficient because the data stays within
the chip or device, and simply passes through internal buffers on its way to another location in
the same bank.
If the L2P table is very large, rather than storing it in a coupled SRAM, it can be stored
within the DRAM module that it indexes. In such a case, to protect the L2P table from row
hammer attacks, a randomized index of metadata rows can be maintained in a first-level L2P
table in SRAM. The first-level L2P table in SRAM is a directory (base+offset physical address
to physical row in DRAM) to a second-level L2P table maintained in DRAM. The second-level
L2P table contains the actual mapping, e.g., DRAM logic row to physical row mapping. In this
manner, implementations are provided that straddle the DRAM module and memory controller
boundary, and which hierarchically address rows in the DRAM through randomized mapping.
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Since true random number generators are slow when used directly, a true random number
generator can be used to seed a pseudorandom number generator at some reasonable granularity.
To reduce the energy and time needed to relocate rows, a counter can count the number of
activations since the last move. The counter can comprise relatively few bits and the logical row
can be moved when the counter overflows. The counter can be designed to overflow at a point
well before the number of row hammers necessary to flip neighboring bits. This number is
dictated by the physics of the DRAM technology used.
Some systems-on-chips use more than one row address bits in the hash functions for
DRAM bank addresses. In such DRAMs, swapping row addresses may result in the moving of
data between two banks, which can be beneficial from a row hammer mitigation standpoint, as
the aggressor row is now placed in any of several, e.g., eight, banks. In such a case the memory
controller is configured to keep track of the rows that crossed bank boundaries and accordingly,
issue commands to the correct bank.
The row swap can be limited within the same bank for simplicity, and for energy and
time conservation purposes. Limiting the swapping of rows to within a single bank abstracts
away implementation details from the memory controller, which can send the same addresses
and let indirection be performed inside the DRAM. As mentioned before, extending this
mechanism to enable swapping across banks, e.g., using copying primitives as described in [1],
requires the active participation of the memory controller. To access a particular row, the
memory controller queries the L2P to identify the correct bank at which the particular row
currently resides.
To reduce memory footprint, rather than having bits built into the L2P table, a separate
table of smaller size can be maintained as a LRU cache. Entries of this table are used to choose
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the rows to randomize (rather than the rows to refresh). The LRU cache table includes fields
such as the valid bit, the row address, the activation count, a notion of a timestamp (or age), etc.
If the LRU cache is implemented as part of the bank logic, the row number would be smaller,
making the representation more compact. Alternatively, the LRU cache can be implemented in
the memory controller, with a somewhat larger footprint, but with the ability to share space
between multiple chips and banks. In this case, the protocol between the memory controller and
the DRAM is modified to include a command to request row randomization.
As opposed to techniques that harden against row hammer attacks by refreshing victim
rows, the techniques described herein use indirection and dynamic randomization of row
mappings to make it harder to consistently hammer aggressor rows. Risk due to bit flips that
happen at row-distances greater than unity is thereby well mitigated. Per the techniques, an
attacker cannot choose or predict the physical row of a DRAM that is to be activated.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques that use a combination of indirection and
randomization to make it difficult for an attacker to hammer rows of a dynamic random access
memory. Per the techniques, the relationship between memory addresses and physical rows is
made random and dynamic, such that the physical relationship between the rows is difficult, if
not impossible, to discover and exploit.
REFERENCES
[1] Seshadri, Vivek, Yoongu Kim, Chris Fallin, Donghyuk Lee, Rachata Ausavarungnirun,
Gennady Pekhimenko, Yixin Luo et al. “RowClone: fast and energy-efficient in-DRAM bulk
data copy and initialization.” In Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE/ACM International
Symposium on Microarchitecture, pp. 185-197. 2013.

https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3361

9

: Preventing Row Hammer Attacks by Dynamic Indirection of Row Addre

[2] Kim, Moonsoo, Jungwoo Choi, Hyun Kim, and Hyuk-Jae Lee. “An Effective DRAM
Address Remapping for Mitigating Rowhammer Errors.” IEEE Transactions on Computers 68,
no. 10 (2019): 1428-1441.
[3] Lee, Eojin, Ingab Kang, Sukhan Lee, G. Edward Suh, and Jung Ho Ahn. “TWiCe: preventing
row-hammering by exploiting time window counters.” In Proceedings of the 46th International
Symposium on Computer Architecture, pp. 385-396. 2019.
[4] Kim, Yoongu, Ross Daly, Jeremie Kim, Chris Fallin, Ji Hye Lee, Donghyuk Lee, Chris
Wilkerson, Konrad Lai, and Onur Mutlu. "Flipping bits in memory without accessing them: An
experimental study of DRAM disturbance errors." In 2014 ACM/IEEE 41st International
Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), pp. 361-372. IEEE, 2014.
[5] Frigo, Pietro, Emanuele Vannacci, Hasan Hassan, Victor van der Veen, Onur Mutlu,
Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert Bos, and Kaveh Razavi. “TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of
Target Row Refresh.” presented at the Forty-First IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
May 15-18, 2020, preprint available online at https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.01807.
[6] Aweke, Zelalem Birhanu, Salessawi Ferede Yitbarek, Rui Qiao, Reetuparna Das, Matthew
Hicks, Yossi Oren, and Todd Austin. "ANVIL: Software-Based Protection Against NextGeneration Rowhammer Attacks." In Proceedings of the Twenty-First International Conference
on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, pp. 743-755.
2016.

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

10

